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STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Richard Hardy ("Hardy") owns a home and real property (the "Subject Property")
located at 2044 West 4300 North, Helper, Utah. [R376 ,r l] In late 2012 or early 2013,
Hardy listed the Subject Property for sale with Bridge Realty, a real estate brokerage.
[R3 76 ,r 2] Hardy then met the Montgomerys at church, and the Montgomerys expressed
interest in buying the Subject Property. [R37613] Hardy wanted to sell the Subject
Property to the Montgomerys, but he also wanted to deprive Bridge Realty of its real
estate commission. [R376 ,r,r 3-4; 466:1-11] With this goal in mind, 1 Hardy retained
attorney Mark Morley to draft a Lease Agreement (''the Lease Agreement") with an
option to purchase the house after the Bridge Realty listing agreement had expired.
[R376 ,r,r 3-4; R377116, 9; 466:1-11; Lease Agreement attached to Addendum of
Appellant's Brief as "Trial Exhibit 1"] Attached to the Lease Agreement, and
incorporated therein by specific reference in paragraph 36, was a Real Estate Purchase
Contract ("REPC") with a Seller Financing Addendum. [R37716; Lease Agreement

With respect to Hardy's deliberate scheme to deprive Bridge Realty of a real estate
commission, Hardy offered the following testimony:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Did you ever tell Mark Morley in the presence of my client that ... you
were concerned that if there was a purchase of the home that Bridge
Realty would seek a commission?
Yes.
You were concerned?
Yes.
You wanted to make sure Bridge Realty did not receive a commission.
Correct?
Well, yes. That, that was the issue, yes, yes, I didn't want them.

[R466: 1-11, emphasis added.]
I
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attached to Addendum of Appellant's Brief as "Trial Exhibit I"] On April 17, 2013, the
parties signed the Lease Agreement. [R3 77 1 7; Lease Agreement attached to Addendum
of Appellant's Brief as "Trial Exhibit 1"] The Montgomerys, who were not represented
by counsel, delivered a $7,000 check to Hardy as an earnest money deposit to be "applied
to the real estate purchase contract".2 [R441:8-23; check no. 2080 dated 4-17-13
Vi

attached to Addendum of Appellant's Brief as "Trial Exhibit 2"] Hardy accepted,
endorsed, and negotiated the $7,000 earnest money deposit check, but he told the
Montgomerys that he would not sign the REPC until ''the end of December" or the "first
of January." [R468-469, check no. 2080 dated 4~17-13 attached to Addendum of
Appellant's Brief as part of"Trial Exhibit 2"] Hardy testified that he delayed his signing
of the REPC because he "didn't like how it was written", he had "a feeling", and "it
didn't need to be signed so ... I wasn't ... in a big hurry to do it anyway." [R468:4-

25; 469:1-2, emphasis added.]
After signing the Lease Agreement, the Montromerys made six consecutive
monthly rent payments of$700-all of which were accepted by Hardy without any

The Montgomerys considered the $7,000 check to be an earnest money deposit
tied to the REPC. In this regard, Jeremy Montgomery offered the following testimony:

2

Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.

A.

And, and you guys paid the nonrefundable option payment. Right, Mr.
Montgomery?
H applied to the real estate purchase contract. Yes, we paid that.
Is that what that says here in the, in this lease agreement?
That was the widerstanding.
Okay.
I didn't draw this agreement up. [R441:8-16, emphasis added]
2
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mention of"additional rent". [R380-381, ,Il] Thereafter, beginning in November 2013,
the Montgomerys ceased rent payments because: (1) Hardy told Jeremy Montgomery in
July 2013 that he was no longer willing to sell the Subject Property to the Montgomerys;
and (2) Hardy's attorney wrote a letter dated September 20, 2013, in which he confirmed
that "Mr. Hardy is not interested in financing the purchase of this property" and alleged
that "Mr. Hardy bears no contractual (or other) obligation to fmance the purchase of the
property." [R377110; 436:1-8; letter dated 9-20-13, attached to Addendum of
Appellant's Brief as "Trial Exhibit 4"]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Hardy signed the Lease Agreement - which incorporated the REPC by specific
reference -and took a $7,000 earnest money deposit from the Mongtomerys. The Lease
Agreement and the REPC gave the Montgomerys an option to purchase the Subject
Property from Hardy, and required Hardy to finance the purchase for a term of 60
months. A few months after signing the Lease Agreement, Hardy told Jeremy
Montgomery that he was no longer ~illing to sell them the Subject Property. About two
months later, Hardy's attorney sent a letter which confirmed that Hardy would not
provide the promised financing. Hardy's conduct constitutes a material and anticipatory
breach of the REPC, despite Hardy's argument that the REPC is meaningless because it
was not signed.
The REPC was incorporated by specific reference in the Lease Agreement, and is
binding on the parties. Hardy does not have the right to cause a significant forfeiture, and
3
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reap a huge windfall, because he refused to sign a document which he admits "didn't
need to be signed." Hardy's argument in this regard ignores reality, and flies in the face
of the doctrine of substantial compliance and policy against forfeiture in residential lease
cases. Hardy is simply not entitled to breach the REPC and keep the Montgomerys'
$7,000 earnest money deposit.
Hardy's argument that he is entitled to "additional rents", which neither he nor his
attorney mentioned or requested while receiving many months of lease payments from
the Montromerys, is also without merit.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE LEASE AGREEMENT
INCORPORATED THE REPC BY REFERENCE - AND HARDY
KNEWIT

Hardy and his counsel ignore the plain language of the Lease Agreement and
relentlessly argue that the REPC was meaningless because it was not signed. However,
as Hardy testified at trial, the REPC "didn't need to be signed" because it was attached
and specifically incorporated by reference in paragraph 36 of the Lease Agreement.
I.&)

When Hardy signed the Lease Agreement, he became contractually obligated to comply
with the terms of the REPC. Since the REPC included a Seller Financing Addendum
stating that Hardy would sell the Subject Property to the Montgomerys and finance the
sale of the Subject Property for a term of 60 months, Hardy committed a material breach

4
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of the REPC in July 2013 when he declared that he was no longer willing to sell the
Subject Property to the Montgomerys. 3
A. Hardy's Committed an Anticipatory and Material Breach of the REPC
The primary purpose of the REPC was to give the Montgomerys an option to
purchase the Subject Property after September 15, 2013, with Hardy financing the
purchase for a term of 60 months. When Hardy called Jeremy Montgomery in July 2013
and declared that he was no longer willing to sell the Subject Property to the
Montgomerys, Hardy committed an anticipatory and material breach of the REPC. See
Cobabe v. Stanger, 844 P.2d 298 (Utah 1992)("An anticipatory breach occurs when a

party to an executory contract manifests a positive and unequivocal intent not to render
its promised performance.") Hardy's anticipatory breach was further reinforced by the
letter of Hardy's counsel dated September 20, 2013, which unequivocally confirmed that
Hardy would not finance any purchase of the Subject Property by the Montgomerys. 4

Although Hardy argues that he did not refuse to sell the Subject Property during
his July 2013 telephone conversation with Jeremy Montgomery, Judge Harmond received
testimony from both parties regarding the matter, weighed the credibility of the
witnesses, and made a finding of fact that Hardy did refuse to sell the Subject Property in
July 2013. [R377 ,10] This finding of fact is clearly subject to a "clearly erroneous"
standard of review. See Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company, 776 P.2d 896,
899-900 (Utah 1989)(factual findings are clearly erroneous only if they are "against the
clear weight of the evidence.")

3

Hardy makes the argument that the letter of September 20, 2013, cured any
previous material breach because it confirmed that Hardy would sell the Subject Property
to the Montgomerys. However, this would have been, at best, a partial cure of Hardy's
material breach because the letter unequivocally confirmed that Hardy would not finance
the purchase of the Subject Property.
4

5
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Since Hardy committed an anticipatory and material breach of the REPC, the
Montgomerys were entitled to a return of the $7,000 earnest money deposit pursuant to
paragraph 16.2 of the REPC, which states:

Seller Default. If Seller defaults, Buyer may elect one of the following remedies:
(a) cancel the REPC, and in addition to the return of the Earnest Money Deposit,
or Deposits, if Applicable, Buyer may elect to accept from Seller, as liquidated
damages, a sum equal to the Earnest Money Deposit, or Deposits, if applicable; or
(b) maintain the Earnest Money Deposit, or Deposits, if applicable, in trust and sue
Seller to specifically enforce the REPC; or (c) accept a return of the Earnest
Money Deposit, or Deposits, if applicable, and pursue any other remedies
available at law. If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay
the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand. [Lease Agreement attached to
Addendum of Appellant's Brief as "Trial Exhibit 1"]
Pursuant to paragraph 16.2 of the REPC, Hardy was obligated to return the earnest
money deposit to the Montgomerys. When Hardy refused to do so, the Montgomerys
were fully within their rights to expect Hardy to apply the earnest money deposit to rent,
search for a new place to live, and demand a refund of the remaining balance of the
earnest money deposit after moving from the Subject Property.
B. Utah Recognizes a Strong Policy Against Forfeiture in Residential Lease
Cases, and Applies the Doctrine of Substantial Compliance
Judge Harmond found that the Montgomerys were approximately 14 days late on
their JW1e 2013 rent payment. However, pursuant to well-established Utah law, a late
rent payment does not justify forfeiture of a $7,000 earnest money deposit. In Housing

Authori'ty v. Delgado, 914 P .2d 1163 (Utah 1996), the Housing Authority sought eviction
of a tenant who allegedly made a late and deficient rent payment. In holding that the
tenant was not subject to eviction, the Utah Court of Appeals embraced the "substantial
6
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compliance doctrine" and a "general policy disfavoring forfeitures" in residential lease
cases. Id at 1165. The Utah Court of Appeals also said:
Our conclusion that equitable principles may be applied in an appropriate
situation - even involving nonpayment of rent - to preclude forfeiture of a
lease is further bolstered by the Second Restatement of Property, which does not
distinguish between residential and commercial leases in stating, "Equitable
considerations in regard to the tenant's failure to meet his rent obligation
may justify relieving him from forfeiture of the lease for his failure to pay the
rent despite provisions in the lease which would otherwise allow it."
Restatement (Second) of Property§ 12.1 cmt. N (1976); see also Robert S.
Schoshinski, American Law of Landlord and Tenant§ 6:2; at 392 (1980)("On well
established principles of equity, courts have routinely granted relief from
forfeiture in the case of a breach of a covenant to pay rent ... where the tenant
stands ready to correct his defaul~."); 49 Am. Jur. 2d Landlord & Tenant§ 342
( 1995)(observing equitable relief against forfeiture may be available when regular
rent payment is not technically timely because of relatively insignificant act or
omission of lessee acting in good faith). (Emphasis added.)
Id.

Pursuant to Housing Authority v. Delgado, Utah law allows equity to intervene to
avoid forfeiture, and a corresponding windfall, based on technical violations of a lease
agreement. For this reason alone, Hardy's argument that the Montgomerys forfeited a
$7,000 earnest money deposit base~ on a technical violation of the Lease Agreement is
without merit.
II.

MOST OF HARDY'S "ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW" ARE

BASED ON FACTUAL FINDINGS, AND ARE THEREFORE SUBJECT
TO A "CLEARLY ERRONEOUS" STANDARD OF REVIEW
The vast majority of the "Issues Presented for Review" are based on factual
findings, and are therefore subject to a "clearly erroneous" standard of review. A more
detailed analysis of this assertion is set forth below:
7

.
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ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

STANDARD OF REVIEW

1. Whether the court below erred in

A determination of whether a contract is

ruling that the option paid to Hardy by

facially ambiguous is a question of law,

the Montgomery's was refundable to

subject to "de novo" review. If the contract

the Montgomery's despite the lease

is facially ambiguous, 5 then determination of

agreement stating the option was non-

the intent of the parties is a question of fact,

refundable?

subject to "clearly erroneous" review. See,
e.g., Wilson v. Johnson, 234 P .3d 1156 (Utah
App. 2010).

2. Whether the trial court erred in ruling

Judge Harmond' s findings regarding the

that Hardy anticipatorily repudiated the

substance of Hardy's July 2013 telephone

option to purchase the property in July

conversation with Jeremy Montgomery are

of2013 even though the Montgomery's

findings of fact, made after hearing trail

were in default of the lease agreement at testimony and weighing the credibility of
the time of the claimed repudiation and

witnesses. As such, they are subject to

the court finding [Montgomerys'] duty

"clearly erroneous" review. Moreover,

to perfonn the options was suspended?

whether an alleged breach of contract "is so

In a case such as this, where a contract is drafted entirely by counsel for the
Plaintiff and the Defendants are not represented by counsel, any ambiguities must be
construed against the drafter. See Parks Enterprises, Inc., v. New Century Realty, 652
P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1982)("1t is also settled law ·that a contract will be construed against
its drafter.")
s
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insubstantial as to trigger the application of
equitable principles is a question of fact."

Housing Authority v. Delgado, 914 P.2d at

1165.

3. Whether the court below erred in

See responses to Issues 1 and 2 above.

finding the REPC was a binding
agreement enforceable against Hardy,
and justifying the refund of the $7,000
non-refundable option payment when
the Montgomery's had failed to perform
the terms of the option necessary to
exercise the option.

4. Whether the trial court erred in ruling

See responses to Issues 1 and 2 above.

the REPC was a binding agreement
when parties all testified they intended
for the REPC to not be a binding
agreement. 6

It is worth noting that this representation is simply false. As set forth above,
Hardy testified that the REPC "didn't need to be signed", and Jeremy Montgomery
testified that the $7,000 earnest money deposit '~applied to the real estate purchase
contract."
6
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5. Whether the lower court was wrong

"If by the terms of a contract one party to it

by ruling that Hardy waived his right to

is required to do a particular thing by a given

collect additional rents when the lease

time to keep the contract in force, but fails to

agreement contained a non-waiver

do so, and the other party, after the default of

clause and the case law cited by the

the first party, does something by which he

court has been corrected by other case

manifests an intention to continue the

law.

contract in force, he may be deemed to have
waived his right to terminate the contract for
a past default, and the first party may treat
the contract as still in force, and by reason
thereof the law gives him a reasonable time
thereafter to do the thing which was omitted
by him. Whether a waiver has taken place
or not ordinarily depends upon the
peculiar facts and circumstances of a
give~ case, and, in most instances,
presents a question of fact rather than of
law, or at least a mixed question of law
and fact. Where a waiver prevents a
forfeiture, the law ordinarily permits a
liberal construction to be placed on the
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

acts of the party waiving with the view of
bringing about a waiver of such a
forfeiture." Loftis v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 114 P. 134, (Utah 1911 )(emphasis

added).

"To find a waiver, the court must ascertain
whether [the plaintiff] intended to waive the
claim. The determination of intent is a
question of fact, and thus, will only be
reversed if the district court's finding is
clearly erroneous." Aris Vision Institute v.
Wasatch Property Management, Inc., 121

P.3d 24 (Utah App. 2005)(emphasis added,
citations omitted).

6. Whether the lower court erred in

_See Response to Issue 5 above.

calculating late fees when the
Montgomery's did not pay the full
amount of rent for any month, the court
found late fees not on the full

11
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installment amount but on the partial
amount of$700, and the Montgomery's
did not pay any rent for the months of
November through March. 7

7. Whether the lower court erred in

See Response to Issue 5 above.

calculating damages when the court
ruled the Montgomery's incurred
damages in June and not May when the
Montgomery's had only a partial
payment of rent for May. 8

Since Judge Harmond had the advantage of seeing and hearing the parties'
testimony at trial, and his findings of fact cannot be proven to be "clearly erroneous", his
findings of fact should not be disturbed in this case. See Housing Authority v. Delgado,
914 P .2d at 1165 ("when, as here, there is conflfoting evidence, we give deference to the
7

Since Hardy wrongfully retained the Montgomerys' $7,000 earnest money
deposit, which rightfully belonged to the Montgomerys during the months of November
2013 through March 2014, the Montgomerys were within their rights to expect Hardy to
apply the earnest money deposit to rent, search for a new place to live, and demand a
refund of the remaining balance of the earnest money deposit after moving from the
Subject Property.
Judge Harmond imposed late fees and liquidated damages for the month of June
because the rent payment was late, and the requisite late fee was not paid. Since the May
rent payment was provided before any late fees or liquidated damages were incurred, and
the additional rent provision was deemed waived, Hardy incurred no "damages"
regarding the month of May.
8
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trial court as the factfinder and we acknowledge its advantageous position vis-a-vis the
trial, the parties, and the witnesses")(quoting Dang v. Cox Corp., 655 P.2d 658,660
(Utah 1982)).

Ill.

UTAH LAW RECOGNIZES THAT "PARTIES TO WRITTEN
CONTRACTS MAY MODIFY, WAIVE OR MAKE NEW TERMS
REGARDLESS OF PROVISIONS IN THE CONTRACTS TO THE
CONTRARY"
Judge Harmond heard testimony from the parties, received documentary evidence,

and made a finding that Hardy accepted the Montgomerys' monthly rent payments of
$700 without making any mention of alleged "additional rent". Moreover, Judge
Harmond found that the letter of Hardy's counsel dated September 20, 2013 "details
other amounts owing and references several provisions of the Lease", but makes no
mention of any alleged "additional rent".
Utah law recognizes that "parties to written contracts may modify, waive or make
new terms regardless of provisions in the contract to the contrary." ASC Utah, Inc., v.
WolfMountain Resorts, 245 P.3d 184 (Utah 2010). Consequently, "under some

circumstances, a no-waiver provision can itself be waived." Id.
Judge Harmond's finding that Hardy waived any claim for "additional rent" is a
finding of fact subject to a "clearly erroneous" standard of review, and should not be
disturbed on appeal.

13
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CONCLUSION
Hardy is fighting for a windfall and a corresponding forfeiture which would be
contrary to clearly-established Utah law. See Housing Authority v. Delgado, 914 P.2d at
1165. The decision of the trial court should be affirmed, and the Montgomerys should be
awarded attorney's fees and costs associated with Hardy's appeal pursuant to Paragraph
17 of the REPC, which provides for an award of attorney's fees and costs to the
prevailing party of any litigation to enforce the REPC.
DATED this 22nd day of November, 2016.

CLIFFORD LAW OFFICES

By:~
Shane Clifford

Attorney for Appellants Jeremy Montgomery
and Julie Montgomery
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH UTAH RULE OF APPELLATE
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compliance with the type-volume limitation set forth in Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure
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DATED this 22nd day ofNovember, 2016.
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following:
Tyler A. Woodworth
TYLER A. WOODWORTH, P.C.
POBox225
Altamont, UT 84015
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ADDENDUM.
1. Relevant Excerpts from Trial Transcript. ·
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1

7TH DISTRICT COURT - PRICE

2

CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

3

=========
4

RICHARD HARDY,

5
6

7

v}

) EVIDENTIARY HEARING
PLAINTIFF,

vs.
JEREMY MONTGOMERY,
MONTGOMERY,

)
)
)
)
)

JULIE

140700039

)

) CONTRACTS

8

9

) CASE

_______________
DEFENDANTS.

)

) JUDGE GEORGE M. HARMOND
)

10

11

12
13
14
15

BE IT REMEMBERED

that this matter came on for hearing

before the above-named court on

October 2, 2015.

WHEREUPON, the parties appearing and represented by
counsel, the following proceedings were held:

16
17

ONLINE REQUEST# 16392

18
19
20
~

21

OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT

22

(From Electronic Recording)

23
24
25
0001

1
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1

A.

I apologize.

2

Q.

-- any time after September 15th, 2013.

3

A.

And before the end of the term of the

4

lease as considered for the option,

5

tenant shall pay landlord a nonrefundable

6

option payment of 7,000 option payment.

7

Q.

10
11
12
13

Thank you.

And, and you guys paid the nonrefundable option

8

9

Okay.

payment.
A.

Right, Mr. Montgomery?
If applied to the real estate purchase contract.

Yes, we paid that.
Q.

Is that what that says here in the, in this

lease agreement?

14

A.

That was the understanding.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

A.

I didn't draw this agreement up.

17

Q.

Help me understand because you said that the

18

real estate purchase contract wasn't binding until it was

19

signed.

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

And now you're saying that the 7,000

should be applied to the real estate purchase contract.

23

A.

That's what it was for.

24

Q.

But you said it wa~n•t, the real estate purchase

25

contract wasn't binding--.
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1

Q.

Did you ever tell Mark Morley in the presence of

2

my client that a, you were concerned that if there was a

3

purchase of the home that Bridge Realty would seek a

4

commission?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

You were concerned?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

You wanted to make sure Bridge Realty did not

9

10
11
12
13

receive a commission.
A.

Well, yes.

Correct?
That, that was the issue, yes, yes,

I didn't want them.
Q.

Is that why you didn't sign the real estate

purchase contract?

14

A.

No.

15

Q.

Okay.

16

A.

Can .I tell you why?

17

Q.

Not right now.

18

A.

Okay.
THE JUDGE:

19
20

asked is all.

21

talk, okay.

Your attorney will get another chance to
Thank you, Mr. Hardy.

THE WITNESS:

22
23

Just answer the question you're

Q.

(MR.

CLIFFORD: )

Thank you.
Isn't it true that when you

24

signed the real, when you signed the lease agreement the

25

real estate purchase contract was attached to it as

0066

66
R466
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

2

Q.

And a, did Mark Morley draft the real estate

purchase contract as well as the lease agreement?

3

A.

I believe he did.

4

Q.

And a, when you signed the lease agreement did you

5

sign the real estate purchase contract?

6

A.

Started to but then I stopped.

7

Q.

Why did you stop?

8

A.

I didn't like how it was written.

9

Q.

And you're claiming Mark Morley was your lawyer.

10

Right?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

And you didn't like the way the person--

13

A.

When I say written, it's just, it's just a feeling

14

I had just let it go until it was time for the a, we agreed

15

to let it go, not to sign it until January, you know, first

16

of January, end of December and I agreed to that, we both

17

agreed to that.

18

Q.

You're saying my client agreed to that?

19

A.

Yes.

20
21
22

we, he suggested and I agreed, there was no

need to sign it really.
Q.

Now, you said you started reading through it and

you felt uneasy?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

What made you feel uneasy about it?

25

A.

I don't know.

Just a, just a feeling.

It
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1

didn't, first of all it didn't need to be signed so, so I

2

wasn't, you know, in a big hurry to do it anyway but--

3

Q.

Well, didn't my client want you to sign it?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

You're claiming not?

6

A.

He asked me to, if it would be all right if we

7
8
9

10

waited until the end of December, first part of January.
Q.

But isn't it true that, that you said you

couldn't sign it because you wanted your wife to review it
first?

11

A.

I don't remember that at all.

12

Q.

Okay.

13

And you don't remember what made you

uneasy when you read it?
Just, just a feeling, you know.

14

A.

Not really, no.

15

Q.

Do you have the, that page in front of you, the

16

real estate purchase contract?

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Isn't it true that that contract provides that

19

the earnest money payment of $7,000 would have to go into

20

a brokerage real estate trust account?

21

22
23

A.

I don't see it here and I don't remember seeing

it back two years ago or whenever we were doing this.
Q.

Okay.

On the front page it says real estate
Do you see a heading below that says

24

purchase contract.

25

Offer to Purchase and, and Ear?est Money Deposit?
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